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I. INTRODUCTION
Welfare caseloads have dropped dramatically in recent years, prompting many policy
makers to declare an end to welfare as we have known it. The recent decline in caseloads has
occurred concurrently with two distinct events. First, most states have restructured their welfare
programs to place greater emphasis on getting welfare recipients into jobs. Second, the economy
has exhibited strong employment growth with historically low unemployment rates throughout
this period, providing unprecedented opportunities for welfare recipients to find employment.
Determining the relative importance of these two effects in explaining past changes in welfare
caseloads is essential in assessing their future trends. Two recent studies, one by Levine and
Whitmore (written as a technical report of the Council of Economic Advisers, 1997) and the other
by Ziliak et al. (1997), have found that economic conditions dominate in explaining caseload
reductions, but they differ widely in the estimated size of the effect. The CEA attributes 40
percent of caseload decline to economic conditions measured by unemployment rates, while Ziliak
et al. attribute 78 percent to unemployment rates. With economic conditions accounting for a
substantial portion of the downward trend in welfare caseloads, the question confronting many
policy makers is what might happen to the number of welfare cases when the inevitable downturn
in the economy occurs. This question has far-reaching ramifications not only for those who turn
to welfare programs for income support but also for the financing of state and federal welfare
programs, for the funding of other programs that have benefitted from the reduction in welfare
expenditures, and for the remaining income maintenance programs such as unemployment
insurance and disability insurance.
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Several studies have addressed the effect of business cycles on welfare caseloads. The
approaches taken by these studies range from national-level time series analyses to state-level
pooled cross section, time series studies. Some micro-level studies of individual welfare
recipients, while not necessarily directly addressing the effect of business cycles on caseloads, are
pertinent to this issue as well. Our proposed study relates most closely to four recent analyses
that estimate the effect of economic conditions on welfare caseloads. These studies include Blank
(1997), Levine and Whitmore (1997), Ziliak et al. (1997), and the Lewin Group (1997). The
Lewin Group study is representative of the general methodology employed by these studies to
estimate this relationship and simulate the effects on caseloads of various scenarios of business
cycle trends. Specifically, they regress the number of caseloads (and other measures of program
participation) on demographic, programmatic, and economic variables. By using pooled cross
section, time series data, they control more fully for state and time effects than is possible with
only time series data or cross sectional data. They find that changes in the unemployment rate
have substantial effects on program participation and that these effects are more persistent than
previously found.
Although these studies show the relationship between welfare caseloads and economic
conditions, models such as these that use unemployment rates as the only measure of economic
conditionsalone have been unable to explain the dramatic reduction in caseloads in recent years.
Conversely, this same genre of models has also been unable to explain the large runup in
caseloads during the latter part of the 1980s when the economic conditions were quite robust.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the current models to include additional measures
of labor market conditions that may affect the variation in welfare caseloads. We believe the
2

unemployment rate by itself may be a woefully incomplete measure of economic conditions
affecting potential welfare recipients. The measures we develop are intended to reflect the
availability of attractive jobs to welfare recipients. The paper is exploratory in that the variables
we develop have not previously been used in the research literature that models welfare caseloads.
Some of these variables have been used in the regional economics literature, but not as much in
labor economics. Other variables we use are newly developed for this paper. The variables we use
are all meant to measure aspects of the structure of local labor demand that might affect welfare
recipients, and can reasonably be viewed as exogenous to welfare caseloads and to the labor
supply behavior of potential welfare recipients. Thus, for example, we eschew variables that
simply measure the economic status of potential welfare recipients, such as the unemployment
rate of female household heads with lower levels of education. The economic status of potential
welfare recipients is clearly endogenous in that it will be determined by unobserved welfare
policies that affect welfare caseloads, and the economic status of potential welfare recipients is
clearly affected by labor supply behavior as much as labor demand. Our focus is on labor demand
factors affecting welfare caseloads.1
Specifically, in one set of models, we attempt to explain welfare caseloads at the state
level by not only unemployment, but also state employment growth and three measures of the
industrial mix of the state. State employment growth has been shown in the regional economics
literature to have powerful effects on labor market outcomes, particularly for less-skilled groups

1

Thus, we have not implemented the suggestion of our discussant, Joyce Zickler, that we use the wage and
unemployment rates of various groups of low-skilled workers as explanatory variables. It might be useful to include
such variables in a structural model, in which such variables are treated as endogenous, and other demand and
supply shock variables that might affect these wage and unemployment rates are also included. Our focus here is
on a simpler reduced form specification that focuses on labor demand factors affecting welfare caseloads.
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(Bartik, 1991; Bartik, 1996; Blanchard and Katz, 1992). Some literature also suggests that local
employment growth may also affect exit rates from welfare (Hoynes, 1997). One of the industrial
mix measures, the average wage premium implied by the area’s industry mix, has also been found
in the regional economics literature to affect labor market outcomes (Bartik, 1993a, 1996).
Finally, our work explaining state caseloads also includes two other industrial mix measures, one
that measures the extent to which the state’s industries are likely to hire only those with high
school degrees, and the other measuring how likely the state’s industries are to hire welfare
recipients. These measures are new, but have some logical relationship to whether welfare
recipients are likely to be able to find jobs.
In another set of models, at the metropolitan level, we go beyond net employment growth
to examine how welfare caseloads are related to gross job flows. Studies, such as Davis and
Haltiwanger (1992), have shown that the gross flows of employment change capture the dynamics
of labor markets better than aggregate measures such as net employment change or
unemployment rates. It may be the case that welfare recipients in labor markets with high job
turnover have a difficult time finding and retaining jobs. We have access to a unique data set that
contains estimates of the components of employment change at the metropolitan level. We
examine the effects of gross job flows, and its components on welfare case loads for metropolitan
areas during the early 1990s.
Our finding from both sets of models is that welfare caseloads are explained by not only
unemployment but also many other aspects of the structure of local labor demand. At the national
level, as we will see, the present paper is able to explain the runup in caseloads during the later
1980s as largely due to decreasing demand for less-skilled workers. On the other hand, the recent
4

reductions in welfare caseloads cannot be explained by our labor demand indicators, and are most
plausibly explained by a variety of welfare policies. This supports previous results using
unemployment only. However, with an expanded set of labor demand indicators, the conclusion
that welfare reform policies are lowering caseloads is strengthened. For prediction purposes, our
results suggest an expanded set of economic variables that might improve prediction, whether at a
national, state, or local level. Our results also suggest some policies that might help in a positive
way to lower welfare caseloads, include measures to reduce the extent of job destruction or job
instability in the labor market, and measures to improve the educational credentials of welfare
recipients.

II. EXTENSION OF STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES
Most studies, including Blank (1997), Levine and Whitmore (1997), Ziliak et al (1997),
and Lewin (1997), use the total unemployment rate (TUR) to characterize labor market
conditions. The TUR is intended to reflect the job vacancies for low-skill workers. However, the
TUR has been a poor predictor of the number of caseloads during certain time periods. Consider
Michigan’s experience. If the TUR accurately reflected the job opportunities for low-skilled
workers, one would have expected the rapid rundown in the state’s total unemployment rate
during the 1980s to be accompanied by a significant decline in ADC caseloads. As illustrated in
figure 1, the caseloads remained stubbornly high during this period. Only after the waiver went
into effect did the number of caseloads start to follow the decline in the unemployment rate that
had already been falling for two years prior to the waiver.
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As shown in table 1, a simple model of the monthly change in the log of cases regressed
on unemployment rates of various lags shows that the unemployment rate does little to explain the
differences in caseload. However, a dummy variable denoting the month in which Michigan was
granted a waiver (August 1992) is statistically significantly related to ADC caseloads. The waiver
affects the intercept of the regression, but does not affect the slope at any of the lags. This brief
exercise is presented only to illustrate that at least for the state of Michigan, additional macroeconomic variables must be introduced in order to explain caseload reduction.

Model Specification: Additional variables to reflect job opportunities for low-skilled
workers
We add to the estimation several variables that will more fully reflect the labor demand
conditions facing potential welfare recipients. Our first additional labor demand variable is the
employment growth rate of the state. A higher state employment growth rate presumably implies
more job vacancies, as well as fewer jobs being lost through business closings and contractions. It
is arguable that job vacancies and job loss may be at least as important in determining welfare
caseload growth as the percentage of the labor force that happens to be unemployed at a point in
time.
In regional economics research, local employment growth has frequently been used to
explain labor market outcomes of individuals in local labor markets (Bartik, 1991; Blanchard and
Katz, 1992). This research suggests that local employment growth can plausibly be viewed as
exogenous shocks to local labor demand in the short-run and medium-run, based on using
instrumental variables that attempt to measure shifts in national demand for an area’s export
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industries (Bartik, 1991; Blanchard and Katz, 1992). This is one advantage that employment
growth has over the unemployment rate, which is plausibly as much due to labor supply behavior
as labor demand behavior. Regional economics research shows that shocks to employment
growth continue to affect labor force participation rates, wage rates, and per capita earnings in a
local labor market for many years, while the effects of employment growth shocks on local
unemployment rates tend to dissipate quickly (Bartik, 1993b). This suggests that employment
growth measures aspects of local labor demand that will not be completely captured by local
unemployment rates. In addition, the effects of employment growth appear to be greater for less
skilled persons than for others (Bartik, 1996). This suggests that local employment growth may be
particularly important in determining welfare caseloads. Some recent research suggests that local
employment growth is more important in determining exit from welfare, and re-entry into welfare,
than the local unemployment rate (Hoynes, 1997). Other recent research on the spatial mismatch
hypothesis suggests that the employment growth rate in the suburbs vs. the city is more important
than the level of employment in affecting the labor market outcomes of minorities, perhaps
because job vacancies and job losses are particularly important to entry-level workers (Ihlanfeldt
and Sjoquist, 1998).
The second local labor demand variable we add is the average wage premium implied by
the area’s industrial mix. We use the wage premia estimated by Krueger and Summers (1988) for
each of 40 industries at the national level. The wage premium represents estimated industry
effects from a wage regression that regresses wages (including fringe benefits) on worker
characteristics, occupation dummies, and dummies for each industry. The resulting industry
effects reflect the level of compensation that a worker in a specific industry receives that is
7

different from what the market would dictate based on personal characteristics, including
education and experience.2 These industry wage premia, which do not vary over time, are
multiplied for each state/year by the proportion of employment in each two-digit industry, and this
product is then summed over all industries for that state/year cell to get the “average wage
premium” variable that we use. Although the estimated wage premia are taken from a particular
year, research papers by Krueger and Summers (1988) and Katz and Summers (1989) suggest
that industry wage premia are remarkably stable over time. The average wage premium variable
measures how much a typical worker could expect to get in higher wages than expected based on
his/her personal characteristics, assuming that each industry in the state follows the pattern
estimated by Krueger and Summers. If the wage premium entices welfare recipients into the labor
force by exceeding their reservation wage, then states with higher wage premium would be
expected to have fewer cases per capita. On the other hand, if a higher wage premium entices
more higher skilled workers into the labor force as well, and employers use higher wage premia to
be more selective about hiring and retaining workers, then a higher wage premium might damage
job prospects for lower-skill workers, and thus increase welfare caseloads.
The average wage premium, or similar variables measuring whether an area has a high
proportion of “good” jobs, has frequently been used to explain labor market outcomes in regional

2

We extended Krueger and Summers (1988) results for private industries to cover the government sector
in the following manner. These results were developed in a previous project that focused on the wages and
employment of single mothers, so the data used were data on all single mothers from the March CPS from March
1983 to March 1995. We estimated wage equations using these data, regressing the log of the real wage on various
worker characteristics, year dummies, state dummies, and industry dummies. We included dummies for all of
Krueger and Summers’ two-digit private industries, plus dummies for federal employment, and state and local
employment. We regressed Krueger and Summers’ estimated wage premium for each private industry on the
estimated wage premium we obtained from the same industry. This regression was then used to predict a wage
premium for the federal sector, and state and local employment, that is comparable to the private wage premium
numbers generated by Krueger and Summers.
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economics research. A number of studies have used the percentage of employment in
manufacturing or some set of manufacturing industries, to explain local labor market outcomes
(Borjas and Ramey, 1994; Bound and Holzer, 1993; Juhn, 1994; Karoly and Klerman, 1994).
Research by Bartik suggests that the average wage premium variable dominates manufacturing
related variables in explaining labor market outcomes (Bartik, 1996). All these studies show
significant effects of some aspect of job quality on local labor market outcomes. Most of the
studies suggest that local job quality has progressive effects, for example, helping less-educated
workers more than more-educated workers (Borjas and Ramey, 1994; Bartik, 1993a, Bound and
Holzer, 1993), and blacks more than whites (Bound and Holzer, 1993; Bartik, 1993a). However,
Bartik (1996) finds that the wage premium variable tends to help more middle-income groups
rather than low or high income groups. Several studies find that the wage premium or other local
job quality variables tend to affect labor market outcomes for women as much as for men (Karoly
and Klerman, 1994; Bartik, 1993a, 1996), which suggests that these variables will be relevant to
welfare caseloads.
The other two measures of local labor demand are also based on the mix of industries in
the state. Specifically, we include one variable measuring the educational requirements implied by
the state’s industry mix, and the percentage of welfare recipients employed implied by the state’s
industry mix. These two industry mix variables do not have the precedent of extensive previous
use in research, but do seem logically related to labor demand for potential welfare recipients.
For the educational requirements variable, we calculated, for the nation as a whole, and
for each year separately, the percentage of employment in each two-digit industry that was high
school graduates, using data from the March CPS from March 1983 to March 1997. These data
9

were then combined with data from each state and year on the proportion of employment in each
two-digit industry, to calculate a variable measuring the proportion of employees in each
state/year cell that would be high school graduates if each industry hired in a similar pattern as its
national counterpart for that year. We regard this variable as a rough measure of the extent to
which a state’s demand is skewed by industrial composition toward higher education workers.
This variable for a state relative to other states will increase if a state’s industrial composition
becomes more concentrated than the national average in industries that have a high percentage of
employees with a high school education. Because the characteristics of industries for this variable
are measured separately for each year, this variable will also increase relative to other states if a
state’s industrial composition stays the same, but the state’s mix of industries happens to show a
greater than average gain in percentage of employees with a high school education. The
hypothesis is that welfare recipients may qualify for fewer jobs in states that have a higher than
average concentration of jobs requiring high school degrees. As a result, we would expect this
variable to be negatively correlated with caseloads.
The variable measuring whether a state’s industries tend to employ welfare recipients is
measured in a similar manner. The percentage of welfare recipients employed in each two-digit
industry at the national level is calculated using March CPS data. However, for this variable we
used only March 1996 data to define industry characteristics for all years. As will be seen in later
analysis, we want to determine if our variables can explain recent national trends in caseloads, and
we do not want this variable to be spuriously correlated with national trends in welfare caseloads.
The March 1996 percentage employed who are welfare recipients in each industry are multiplied
times the state’s proportion of employment in that year in each respective two-digit industry to
10

create a weighted variable for each state/year cell. This weighted variable tells us what proportion
of employment would be welfare recipients in each state/year cell if each industry in that state and
year had employed welfare recipients in the same proportion that its national counterpart did in
1996. Our first intuition was that this variable should be negatively correlated with caseloads, as
one might expect that states whose industries tend to employ welfare recipients to be easier labor
markets for welfare recipients to obtain jobs. A second explanation, and one that comports with
the results, is that industries that hire a great many welfare recipients may also be the same
industries with high turnover rates and other characteristics that create more welfare recipients,
thus increasing welfare caseloads.
One obvious alternative to our industry mix variables is simply including variables for the
proportion of state employment in each of the two-digit industries used in constructing these
industry mix measures. We rejected this alternative because of our expectation, based on previous
research projects, that such estimation would lead to hopeless problems with multicollinearity.3
Even if multicollinearity were not a problem, there would be some serious problems with trying to
interpret the large numbers of resulting coefficients on individual industries. Using these industry
mix variables at least provides a manageable number of coefficients with some idea about what
the underlying variables are measuring.

3

Bartik experimented with using unrestricted variables for the proportion of employment in each two digit
industry in the research leading to the studies reported in Bartik (1993a) and Bartik (1996). The basic problem is
that nothing is significant when so many industry variables are included in the estimation.
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Descriptive Statistics
To get a better sense of the nature of these local labor demand variables, we report a
variety of descriptive statistics. Table 2 reports, for each of the three industry mix variables, the
“top six” and “bottom six” industries in the calculations used to generate these indices. The
pattern is what one would expect. The education variable tends to be high for various white collar
dominated industries and low for various low-skilled manufacturing and service industries and
agriculture. The welfare employment variable is high for various service-oriented industries and
lower-skilled manufacturing. The wage premium variables are high for some high-wage
manufacturing industries and other heavy industries, as well as more unionized industries, and
lower for service oriented industries.
Table 3 presents means and standard deviations for all five of the local labor demand
variables. In addition to presenting the ordinary standard deviation, we also report the standard
deviation of the residuals from regressing these variables on a set of state and year dummies.
Because the eventual estimation includes a complete set of state and year dummies, it is the
variation in these variables after controlling for unobserved state and year effects that is really
crucial. As the table shows, the variation in the three industry mix variables is dramatically
reduced after controlling for state and year effects. This means that these variables show some
pronounced national time trends and persistent patterns of variation across states.
Table 4 presents the correlation of the five labor demand variables, again after controlling
for state and year effects. Although many of the correlations are statistically significant and of
moderately large size, considerable independent variation in these five variables remains. For
example, the largest absolute value of any correlation in the table is .554. The R-squared in
12

regressing a variable on another variable will be the square of its correlation. Hence, the largest
amount of variance that one variable explains of another is (.554) squared, or .307, less than one
third of the variance.
The pattern of correlations is as one might expect. Employment growth and
unemployment are strongly negatively correlated, although considerable independent variation
remains. There are states in which unemployment remains low even though employment growth
declines. The welfare variable is negatively correlated, as one would expect, with the educational
requirements variable and the wage premium variable. States that have an increasing proportion of
industries that employ welfare recipients also tend to have an increasing proportion of industries
that pay poorly and have lower educational requirements. However, the variables are not close to
perfectly correlated. Finally, the wage premium variable is positively correlated with employment
growth and negatively correlated with the unemployment rate. This is consistent with previous
research that finds, using causality tests, that trends in employment growth and the wage
premium variable at the local level tend to mutually cause each other (Bartik, 1993a). This pattern
of mutual causation is sensible. A state which gains higher wage industries will tend to experience
some growth in labor demand from higher personal income. A state which experiences tightening
labor markets may find it easier to attract higher wage premium industries, which may be less
sensitive to the wage rate paid for labor.
Table 5 explores the spatial pattern of these local demand variables. The table reports, for
1996, the six states with the highest and lowest values of each variable. Unemployment tends to
be low in rural states, but high in a diverse group of states with probably quite diverse economic
problems. Employment growth tends to be high in some western and southern states, and low in
13

diverse states. The spatial pattern of these two variables is far from perfectly matched; for
example, California was 4th in unemployment in 1996 even though it was 12th in employment
growth in 1996. The educational requirements variable tends to be high in northeastern states
with many white collar industries, and low in southern and western states. The wage premium
variable is high in heavily unionized manufacturing-dominated states, and low in states with a
great deal of retail trade and service businesses. The welfare variable is high and low in a diverse
collection of states that are difficult to summarize.
Figure 2 reports the national time trends in these labor demand variables. The
unemployment rate and employment growth have the pattern one would expect, with employment
growth trends seeming to lead unemployment rate trends slightly. The three industry mix variables
show pronounced national time trends. The wage premium variable has dramatically declined over
time as higher-paying manufacturing industries have declined. The welfare employment variable
has increased as service oriented industries have increased. The educational requirements variable
has increased as the proportion of educated workers employed has increased in many industries.
Some additional work, not reported here, shows that the increase in the educational requirements
variable is totally due to changes in the educational composition of individual industries, and not
to changes in industry mix in favor of higher education industries. If the same industry variables
are used for all years in calculating the educational requirements variable, the national time line is
flat.
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Results
Our models are extensions of those used by Blank (1997) and Levine and Whitmore
(1997). The data used are pooled time-series cross section data at the annual level, for all 50
states (plus DC), for all years from 1984 to 1996. The dependent variable in our preferred models
is the natural logarithm of AFDC cases per capita in each state/year cell. All regressions include a
complete set of dummy variables for states and years, in order to control for unobserved fixed
state characteristics that might affect caseloads, and unobserved national trends that might affect
caseloads.4 Specifications include various combinations of the five economic characteristics
mentioned above: unemployment rates, employment growth, demand for high school graduates as
predicted by industrial composition, demand for welfare recipients as predicted by industrial
composition, and state wage premium as predicted by industrial composition. In addition, the
preferred specifications include the log of the AFDC benefit level and whether or not the state has
by that year received a waiver for welfare experimentation from the federal government.5
Specifications differ in the dynamic specification describing the time pattern by which state
economic characteristics affect welfare caseloads.
We began by estimating specifications that matched, as closely as possible given our data,
the empirical models used by Levine and Whitmore, Blank, and some of the annual models used
by Ziliak et al. These results are not fully reported here, but are available upon request.
Specifically, we tried to match the specifications used by Levine and Whitmore (their table 2,

4

State and year effects are in general strongly statistically significant. Therefore, we do not explore
dropping these variables as this might lead to omitted variable bias.
5

We use a rather simple specification of the waiver variable because our focus is on the effects of local
labor demand conditions.
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column 1), Blank (her table 2, column 1), and Ziliak et al (their table 4, column 4). For Blank’s
model, this involved switching the denominator of the dependent variable from total state
population to the number of female household heads, with other relatives present, ages 16-44,
with less than 16 years of education. It turns out that the choice of denominators does not
significantly affect the coefficients on the economic variables that we focus on, so the remainder
of this paper continues to focus on welfare caseloads per capita. In general, we are able to
replicate their results fairly closely for the economic variable we have in common–the
unemployment rate–despite some inevitable differences in the precise data used.
Our detailed presentation stresses three models (table 6). The first model is similar to
Levine and Whitmore and Blank in simply having the level of the ln(caseloads per capita) as a
dependent variable, without allowing for any lagged effects of caseloads. All five economic
characteristics are included. In deciding on an optimal lag structure, we first tested from zero lags
to two lags in unemployment in a model with only unemployment as a state economic
characteristic. The optimal lag length in unemployment was then chosen based on the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC). We then added employment growth to this optimal model, and
tested from zero lags to two lags in employment growth, choosing the optimal lag length in
employment growth based on the AIC. Finally, we added the three industry composition variables
to the regressors, and tested the optimal lag length (from zero to two lags) using the AIC, but
restricting all three industry composition variables to have the same lag length. We include lags in
all the local labor demand variables to allow for the possibility that wages, labor force
participation rates, and other labor market outcomes that affect welfare caseloads will take some
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time to respond to labor demand shocks, and this response may change over time as the local
labor market adjusts.6
Our second model adds in the lagged level of the ln(caseload per capita) as a regressor,
inspired by Ziliak et al’s findings that state welfare caseloads appear to be quite persistent from
year to year. We also find great persistence, with a coefficient on the lagged dependent variable
of 0.913 (standard error = .014; see table for more results). This second model does the same
sequential testing procedure to separately determine the optimal lag length for each of the
economic characteristics variables.
Finally, our third model drops the lagged dependent variable and uses the change in the
ln(caseloads per capita) as a dependent variable. As noted by Ziliak et al, the coefficient close to
one on the lagged caseload dependent variable suggests the possibility that the caseload variable is
non-stationary. Research by Nickell (1981) suggests that coefficients on the lagged dependent
variable in panels with short time series and fixed cross-sectional effects may be biased towards
zero, so it is possible that the true coefficient on the lagged caseload variable is one. Again, the
optimal lag length for the economic characteristics variables in this “changes” model are
determined by sequential testing of various lag lengths. We should state that despite the possibility
that the caseload variable is non-stationary, we regard the non-stationarity of the log of caseloads
per capita as theoretically implausible. This implies that caseloads per capita are a random walk,
with any random factor that happens to push caseloads up or down persisting indefinitely into the
6

Note that the wage premium and welfare employment variables will vary quite a bit over time for a
particular state even though the industry-specific measures used to construct these variables will not vary over
time. These industry mix variables will vary as the industry mix changes over time for a particular state. As shown
in the section on descriptive statistics, even though a great deal of variation in these industry mix variables is
explained by fixed state effects and year effects, there remains much variation across time for a given state that
differs from the national variation over time for the same variable.
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future. It seems more plausible that caseloads are merely highly sluggish in adjusting to shocks,
and that the true coefficient on lagged coefficients is less than one. Hence, we regard model II as
the most intuitively plausible of the three models.
Table 6 shows the raw results for these three models. Before simulating the effects of the
state economic variables, we wish to note several features of these models that already are
apparent in this table. First, it is clear that much more than unemployment in a state’s economic
environment matters to caseloads. Employment growth and the three industrial composition
variables also appear to be highly statistically significant in explaining state caseloads, and this
occurs holding constant any fixed state characteristics, and national trends. Second, lags matter a
great deal, with the lagged value of state economic characteristics in many cases mattering more
than current characteristics in explaining caseloads. Third, in the case of employment growth,
controlling for lagged caseloads makes a major difference in the estimated effects of this variable.
Without controlling for lagged caseloads, employment growth is estimated to have positive effects
on caseloads, while controlling for lagged caseloads, employment growth has negative effects on
caseloads. One explanation of this pattern of results is that states that in the past have had
recessions and employment declines, and as a result have high caseloads in the past, may tend on
average to have higher employment growth as they recover from the downturn. The omission of
lagged caseloads may bias the coefficient on employment growth because higher employment
growth may proxy for poor growth and high caseloads in the past, and past caseloads tend to
persist.
Table 7 simulates the effects of these economic variables. In all cases, what the table
reports is the estimated effects of a 1 percent change in the economic variable four years after the
18

shock, which helps make the effects more comparable between the static and more dynamic
specifications. The number in parentheses at the top of the column for each variable is the
standard deviation of each variable after controlling for state and year effects, that is, the standard
deviation of the residual from regressing that state economic characteristics on state and year
dummies. This number gives some sense of how much each economic variable varies
independently over time for different states. As these numbers reveal, both the unemployment
rate and employment growth show a similar percentage variation, while the high school graduate
and wage premium variables vary only one-fifth as much, and the state welfare variable varies
one-hundredth as much in percentage terms. In addition to reporting results for the state
economic characteristics in our models I, II, and III, we report effects of unemployment in
identical models that only include unemployment as a state economic characteristic. We also
report effects of unemployment in three models similar to those estimated by Levine and
Whitmore (1997), Blank (1997), and Ziliak et al (1997). The Levine and Whitmore model mainly
differs in not including lags in the unemployment rate from our Model I with just unemployment.
The Blank model mainly differs in having a different dependent variable, the log of caseloads per
female headed household with relatives present. The Ziliak model uses as a dependent variable
the “change” in log caseloads per capita, as in our model III, but also first differences all the other
right hand side variables, including the unemployment rate.
The simulation results in table 7 also show a great sensitivity to the exact dynamic
specification. For example, the effects of employment growth and the state economic
characteristics vary greatly from Model I through Model III. Even if only the unemployment rate
is included, the exact dynamics of the specification make a great deal of difference. Including
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lagged unemployment rates increases the estimated effects of unemployment on caseloads, as is
evident from comparing a Levine-Whitmore style model (no lags in unemployment) to Model I
with unemployment only. In addition, the Ziliak style model that first differences all variables
shows a very small effect of unemployment, perhaps because in this model all effects of
unemployment must occur immediately, and the changes in the unemployment rate variable on the
right hand side cannot proxy for past lags in the level of unemployment.
In our preferred model, which is Model II, the effects of unemployment are considerably
reduced, by more than half, when one adds employment growth and the three industrial
composition effects to the specification. A permanent shock to employment growth of 1 percent
has similar effects to a permanent shock to the unemployment rate of 1 percent, and the variation
in these variables over time and states is fairly similar. A one standard deviation in the high school
graduates variable or in the welfare recipient variable also yields roughly similar effects in
magnitude to the employment growth or unemployment rate effects, while the effects of the wage
premium are considerably smaller, and are statistically insignificant. The point estimates suggest,
as one would expect, that faster employment growth lowers welfare rolls. A shift in industrial
composition toward industries that tend to employ high school graduates also increases welfare
rolls, while the point estimates suggest that an increase in high wage premium industries in an area
tends to reduce welfare rolls. These effects are as expected. A surprising finding is that a shift in
the industrial composition toward industries that tend to employ welfare recipients is estimated to
increase welfare rolls. This finding appears to be somewhat sensitive to the specification. As
mentioned above, perhaps this finding can be explained if industries that employ welfare recipients
are also those that tend to have less stable jobs, which might contribute to increasing welfare rolls.
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Welfare rolls might function as a type of substitute for unemployment insurance for some of these
industries. We explore the effect of gross job flows on welfare caseloads in the next section.
A key policy issue is the effects of national or local recessions on welfare caseloads.
Because our preferred specification, with other local labor demand variables, estimates a smaller
coefficient on unemployment, does our preferred specification imply that a recession with high
unemployment has less effect than is believed by other researchers? Our answer to this question is
that the effect of a recession depends upon whether increases in unemployment are accompanied
by similar changes in other local demand variables as have typically occurred in the past. One
could argue that the specifications with only unemployment as a local demand variable already
show the effects of unemployment, with other local labor demand variables allowed to
endogenously adjust along with unemployment in whatever pattern of correlation has
characterized the past joint behavior of these variables. In other words, one could view the
specifications with only unemployment as a local demand variable as a “reduced form” version of
the fuller specification.
To explore this point further, we estimated several auxiliary regressions in which each of
the four labor demand variables, other than unemployment, are regressed on unemployment and a
complete set of state and year dummies. These auxiliary regressions are used, along with the
specification with five labor demand variables and a lagged dependent variable that we call “Full
Model II”, to simulate the effect on welfare caseloads after four years of a one point rise in the
unemployment rate. As can be seen in Table 8, the effects of unemployment in this multi-equation
simulation approximate that of Model II with only unemployment included. We then experiment
with dropping, in turn, each one of the four auxiliary regressions, one at a time, from the multi21

equation simulation. Dropping an auxiliary regression from the simulation implies that we are
holding that variable constant, and not allowing it to change as it does on average when
unemployment goes up. As the table makes clear, it is largely the employment growth variable
that is generating the smaller coefficient on unemployment in Full Model II.
Therefore, the correct answer to the effects on caseloads of unemployment is that the
results of previous authors are fine as long as employment growth increases as it has in the past
when unemployment goes up. However, if we believe that in the nation, or in some particular
state, unemployment may go up without the usual slowing of employment growth, then the effects
of that unemployment rise on welfare caseloads will be smaller than some other researchers have
predicted. Conversely, if the economy of the nation or some state will experience slower
employment growth, but without a rise in unemployment, our model would lead us to predict a
possibly significant rise in welfare caseloads. For example, one could imagine a state with
economic problems that lead to slow employment growth or employment declines, but with
sufficient out-migration and labor force dropouts that unemployment does not increase.
One key issue is whether the models estimated here, with additional labor demand
variables, can explain the national trends in caseloads in the 1980s and 1990s. We explore this
issue in two ways. First, we consider the year dummies estimated by the model. Figure 3 reports
some of the year dummies estimated. (The 1996 dummy is the omitted dummy, so all year effects
are relative to what occurs nationally on average in 1996). One of the graphs compares our
preferred model, Full Model II, with an alternative model, Model II with only unemployment as a
labor demand variables. Analyzing the year dummies here is somewhat complicated because these
models include a lagged dependent variable; hence, if a year dummy is high relative to another
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year’s dummy, this will push up caseloads in subsequent years as well. In any event, this graph
indicates that with only unemployment as a labor demand variable, caseloads were pushed up by
national year trends throughout the 1980s and early 1990s before some decline. With the other
local labor demand variables, the year dummies have a fairly consistent effect throughout the
1980s before showing some decline in the early to mid-1990s. In the other graph in the figure, we
consider the models without a lagged dependent variable, Full Model I and Model I with only
unemployment. This comparison shows a more dramatic contrast. Model I with just
unemployment shows a huge unexplained run-up in caseloads in the 1980s and early 1990s,
whereas the full Model I shows, if anything, some unexplained decline in caseloads, particularly in
the early 1990s.
Analyzing how different variables contribute to these national trends is complicated in our
preferred specification, Full Model II, because of the presence of a lagged dependent variable.
With a lagged dependent variable, caseloads at any point in time can be considered as a function
of caseloads at any lagged past point in time, and trends in between that past time and the present
in other variables, including the year dummies. It so happens that in 1984 and 1989, caseloads per
capita were virtually the same, so in this case the rise in caseloads over some subsequent period is
totally a function of all the other variables in the model. Table 9 uses this fortunate coincidence to
consider whether the model can explain the rise in caseloads that occurred in the 1990s. Previous
research by Blank suggested that economic variables cannot explain the rise in caseloads that
occurred during this period. As the table shows, caseloads per capita rose in “ln percentage
points” by 25.4 percent from 1989 to 1994. In model II, which includes only unemployment as a
state economic characteristic, most of this increase is due to unexplained trends in the national
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time dummies over the 1989 to 1994 time period. But when other state economic characteristics
are included, we actually find that unexplained time dummies show a drop in the caseload
compared to what we would expect.
Panel B breaks down how national variables explain these differences in caseload during
the previous five years. As shown in Panel B, most of the increase in caseloads from 1989 to
1994 appears to be explained by the increase in the “high school graduate demand” industrial mix
variable. This variable increased from an average of 82.9 percent over the 1983-89 period to an
average of 85.7 percent over the 1988-94 period, an increase of 2.8 percent.7 The point estimates
reported in table 7 suggest that each one percent increase in this variable is associated with about
a 0.124 change in the ln(caseload per capita) variable, so an increase of 2.8 percent in this variable
would be expected to increase the ln(caseload per capita) by more than 0.30 or over 30 “log”
percentage points.
How much should we believe this finding? It should be recognized that this finding
extrapolates the effects of relatively small differences in trends across states to relatively large
changes over time for the nation. As shown in table 7, the standard deviation of this variable,
controlling for state and year dummies, is only about one-fifth of 1 percent. It may be perilous to
extrapolate estimated effects of differences across states of one-fifth of 1 percent to differences in
the nation of 2 percent or more. On the other hand, the estimated effect is not inherently
unreasonable. Welfare rolls are only 3 or 4 percent of the labor force in the United States. A
change in welfare rolls of 30 percent is not a large percentage of the U.S. labor force. Changes in
7

For each year, the value of this variable is calculated as a weighted mean over all 50 states and D.C.,
using 1996 state population as weights for all years. The averages reported here are simple averages of these
averages for the previous 7 years, which are the years involved in these calculations given that the model includes
two lags in the high school graduate variable.
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the percentage of high school graduates demanded as a percentage of the workforce of 2 or 3
percent loom very large compared to welfare rolls.

IV. GROSS JOB FLOWS
As suggested in the results in the previous section, caseloads are influenced by
components of net employment change, namely job creation and job destruction. In the previous
section, we found an increase in caseloads in areas with a high concentration of industries that
employ welfare recipients. One interpretation of this result is that jobs in these industries turnover
more often and provide a less stable employment base for welfare recipients. Gross flows, the
summation of job creation and job destruction, are typically used to measure job turnover. The
purpose of this section is to take a closer look at the relationship between gross job flows and the
number of caseloads to see if such information lends additional insight into the effect of labor
market conditions on welfare caseloads.
Gross job flows are obtained by linking establishments longitudinally over a specific time
period. The Census Bureau has embarked on a relatively new project to construct gross
employment flows by linking all establishments, including the service sector which employs a large
percentage of low-skill workers. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) have linked manufacturing
establishments using the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Data File (LRD), but manufacturing
employs only a small percentage of low-skilled workers. Therefore, we requested that the Census
Bureau create a special tabulation of the employment components for all metropolitan areas
between 1989 and 1992. We use these data to examine the relationship between caseloads and
labor market conditions across metropolitan areas.
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Since the employment components span only the 1989-92 period, the analysis is basically a
cross-sectional estimation. However, specification of a limited lag structure is possible, since
caseload data for several years around the 1989-92 period are available. Furthermore,
specification tests of the lagged structure using state-level data reported in the previous section
reveals that either first-differencing the caseloads, or controlling for lagged caseloads, are
plausible specifications. Additional analysis reveals that caseloads at the metropolitan level are
also quite stable. Rank-order correlations of the caseloads for various time differences across
metropolitan areas reveal that the ordering of MSAs according to the number of caseloads is
persistent over time. The correlation for caseloads one year apart is about the same as the
correlation for caseloads 6 years apart. The correlations average between 0.90 and 0.99.
These specifications are shown in table 10. Column A includes the change in caseloads per
capita between 1990 and 1993 from as a dependent variable, whereas columns B and C use the
1993 level of caseloads per capita as a dependent variable and the 1990 level of caseloads is
included as a control variable. These variables are regressed against various labor market
characteristics, including gross job flows. Since gross flows are estimated for the 1989-92 period,
this variable and the net employment change variable are in essence lagged one period.

As can

be seen in the table, using the change in caseloads per capita between 1990 and 1993 yields the
same results as when the lagged dependent variable specification is used.
The persistence of caseloads per capita is evident in the large and highly statistically
significant coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. The lagged unemployment rate variable
is positive and statistically significant, while the contemporaneous unemployment variable is
negative but not statistically significant. Taken together, the sum of the coefficients for these two
26

lags are positive and statistically significant. Net employment change is relatively large and highly
statistically significant. The negative coefficient suggests that areas with higher rates of net job
growth have lower caseloads, as one would expect.
The gross job flow variable is also statistically significant and is positively correlated with
caseloads per capita. Thus, areas with a high degree of job turnover have a larger percentage of
the population on welfare, holding constant the area’s unemployment rate and its rate of net job
creation. This result is consistent with the finding in the previous section that areas with a more
predominant mix of industries that employ welfare recipients will have higher caseloads, with the
interpretation that employment in these industries is less stable. These estimates suggest that the
dynamics of local labor markets that go beyond the typical measures of net employment change
and unemployment rate are associated with changes in caseload. Unfortunately, longer time series
of gross job flows are not available for all industries at any level of aggregation—national, state or
metropolitan. It is not possible to estimate the contribution of gross job flows to the change in
caseloads from the late 1980s to the present, as we did for the industry composition variables in
the previous section.
We also entered the components of gross flows, job creation and job destruction, as
separate variables in the model. Results in column D show that job destruction has a much larger
effect than job creation on welfare caseloads. The coefficient on job destruction is statistically
significantly different from zero, but the coefficient on job creation is not statistically significant.
Areas with higher job destruction are associated with a faster growth in caseloads per capita.
Employment growth was a key variable in explaining changes in welfare caseloads in the previous
section. Obviously, employment growth is related to jobs created and destroyed. The results
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from this section suggest an asymmetry in jobs created and destroyed as they relate to welfare
recipients. The jobs lost in an area are those that are more likely to be held by welfare recipients,
while the jobs created may be those that are less likely to be filled by welfare recipients. The
asymmetry does not necessarily occur across broad sectors with one sector experiencing primarily
job gains while another experiences primarily job losses. On the contrary, most sectors
experience relatively equal shares of job losses and job gains. Even manufacturing, which has
suffered steady net job loss for the past two decades, experiences a large number of job gains.
Rather, the asymmetry more than likely lies within the same, even narrow, sectors and is
characterized by differences in accessibility and qualifications. This interpretation is supported by
results from the previous section related to wage premium and high school qualifications.
A few states were granted waivers to include a work requirement before 1993. These
states included Michigan, New Jersey, Oregon, Utah, and Vermont, according to Ziliak et al.
(1997). We included a dummy variable for metropolitan areas in these states. As shown in
column C, the growth in caseloads per capita was somewhat slower in metropolitan areas with
waivers than in metropolitan areas without waivers.

V. CONCLUSION
Previous studies of the macro-economic determinants of welfare caseloads have had
difficulty in explaining changes in welfare caseloads during the last decade or so using the simple
macroeconomic measure of unemployment. Because welfare recipients will typically get
entry-level jobs, employment variables that are closely related to job vacancies, such as
employment growth, are also important in determining welfare caseloads, as we show empirically
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in this study. Recognizing that welfare recipients face more substantial barriers to employment
than those who typically have more education and skills, we constructed several macro-economic
variables that reflect the education requirement of industries and the predominance of low-skilled
workers hired by various two-digit sectors. Estimates based on a data set of annual time series
observations aggregated to the state level suggest that these variables help in explaining welfare
caseloads. More specifically, areas with higher concentrations of industries that hire welfare
recipients and demand workers with higher education levels have higher caseloads. Based on a
separate set of metropolitan-based estimates, we also found that gross job flows are positively
correlated with welfare caseloads, with job destruction dominating the effects. While the two
sets of results come from different types of estimation and for areas with different levels of
aggregation, the results suggest that skill levels required of industries and the dynamics of the
local labor market, which go beyond the typical measures of unemployment rate, help to explain
the anomalies in changes in welfare caseloads during the past decade. The findings underscore
that welfare recipients have barriers to employment that are different from the rest of the labor
force and thus variables that more closely reflect their circumstances should be considered in
explaining welfare caseloads.
These findings are relevant to those attempting to predict caseloads at the national, state,
or local level, in that it suggests that economic factors other than unemployment could be used to
forecast welfare caseloads. In addition, the findings suggest that policies that can enhance net
employment growth, reduce job volatility, and increase the educational credentials of welfare
recipients may all help to reduce welfare caseloads.
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Table 1.

Estimates of the Effect of Unemployment Rates on ADC Caseloads,
Michigan, Monthly 1980-1998
A

B

Model
Constant

Coeff.

S. E.

Coeff.

S. E.

-.0120***

.0019

-.00007

.0027

Unemployment Rate

.00168

.0023

.0011

.0021

Unemployment Rate (t-1)

.00109

.0036

.0013

.0034

Unemployment Rate (t-2)

.00084

.0036

.0016

.0034

Unemployment Rate (t-3)

-.00511

.0036

-.0063*

.0034

Unemployment Rate (t-4)

.00028

.0036

.0017

.0034

Unemployment Rate (t-5)

.00140

.0036

-.0001

.0033

Unemployment Rate (t-6)

.00085

.0022

.0006

.0033

.0065

.0097

waiver*UR (t-1)

-.0030

.0128

waiver*UR (t-2)

-.0127

.0141

waiver*UR (t-3)

.0097

.0143

waiver*UR (t-4)

-.0103

.0142

waiver*UR (t-5)

.0224

.0138

waiver*UR (t-6)

-.0078

.0098

waiver

-.0359***

.0057

waiver*UR

R-square
.098
.335
Source: State of Michigan, Department of Social Services, Family Independence Agency, Selected years.
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Table 2. Top and Bottom Six Industries for the Three Industry Mix Variables
High School Graduates
Variable
Industry

%

Welfare Recipient Variable
Industry

%

Wage Premium Variable
Industry

%

Top six industries:
Banking and other
finance

98.1

Private household services

3.78

Petroleum products

61.9

Communications

96.4

Leather and leather
products

3.56

Tobacco manufactures

52.7

Other professional
services

96.3

Miscellaneous
manufacturing

2.92

Public utilities

33.6

Public administration

96.3

Social services

2.65

Communications

29.3

Professional and photo
equipment and watches

95.8

Personal services,
excluding private
household services

2.27

Railroad

26.8

Educational services

95.1

Retail trade

2.13

Transportation
Equipment

26.7

Lumber and wood
products

69.8

Not specified metal
industries

0.0

Retail trade, other than
eating and drinking
places

-18.6

Textile mill products

69.1

Aircraft and parts

0.0

Personal services,
excluding private
household services

-19.4

Leather and leather
products

66.7

Other transportation
equipment

0.0

Education services

-21.6

Agriculture

63.4

Tobacco manufactures

0.0

Eating and drinking
places

-21.9

Apparel and other textile
products

62.4

Petroleum and coal
products

0.0

Social services

-33.0

Private household
services

48.4

Forestry and fisheries

0.0

Private household
services

-51.7

Bottom six industries:

Notes: The wage premium number for each industry is actually 100 times differential of each industry from all
industry average for ln (wage). The high school graduates variable is % of industry’s employees with high school
degree as of 1996, from March 1997 CPS. The welfare recipient variable is the % of industry’s employees who
also receive welfare the previous year, from March 1996 CPS.
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Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations of Five Local Demand Variables

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Adjusted
Standard
Deviation

Unemployment rate

6.85

2.03

1.08

Employment growth (%)

1.89

1.89

1.19

% High School Graduates

84.43

2.25

0.23

% Welfare Recipient

0.95

0.04

0.01

Wage premium

-1.35

1.26

.25

Notes: All means and standard deviations are weighted by the 1996 population of the state.
Means and standard deviations are calculated based on data for 51 states (including D.C.)
and 15 years (1982-96). The adjusted standard deviation is the weighted standard deviation
of the residual from a preliminary regression of the variable on year and state dummies.
This preliminary regression was also weighted.
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Table 4. Correlations for Five Labor Demand Variables

Unemployment
Rate

Employment
Growth

Employment
Growth

High School
Graduates
Variable

Wage
Premium
Variable

Welfare
Recipient
Variable

-0.538
(.0001)

0.091
(.0114)

-0.364
(.0001)

0.032
(.3837)

-0.112
(.0019)

0.153
(.0001)

-0.003
(.8990)

0.283
(.0001)

-0.525
(.0001)

High School
Graduates
Variable
Wage
Premium
Variable

-0.554
(.0001)

Notes: These correlations are weighted correlations using 1996 population weights for all
states. Correlations are for residuals from weighed regression of each of five variables on
year and state dummies. Underlying observations are for 51 states (including D.C.) and 15
years (1982-96.) Number in parentheses is probability of correlation of this size occurring
by chance if true correlation was zero.

35

Table 5. States with Highest and Lowest Values of Each Variable, 1996.

Unemployment
Rate

Employment
Growth
Rate

High School
Graduates
Rate

Wage
Premium
Index

Welfare
Recipients
Rate

1

Washington DC
8.7

Nevada
6.19

Washington
DC
91.76

Indiana
-.23

Nevada
1.25

2

West Virginia
7.6

Utah
4.58

New York
88.18

Michigan
-.32

Rhode Island
1.06

3

Arkansas
7.5

Arizona
4.54

Massachusetts
87.97

Delaware
-.64

Florida
1.05

4

California
7.5

Oregon
3.40

Connecticut
87.82

Ohio
-.64

Montana
1.05

5

New Mexico
6.7

Colorado
3.06

New Jersey
87.82

Illinois
-.80

Maine
1.03

6

Louisiana
6.6

Georgia
3.01

Maryland
87.73

Kansas
-.92

New
Hampshire
1.03

Rank

Top six states:

Bottom six states:
46

Wisconsin
3.6

New Mexico
.85

Massachusetts
85.79

Maine
-3.53

Indiana
.94

47

Iowa
3.3

New York
.77

Idaho
85.78

Florida
-3.84

Connecticut
.93

48

Utah
3.2

Arkansas
.67

Arizona
85.70

Montana
-4.34

Washington
.93

49

North Dakota
3.0

Rhode island
.50

North Carolina
85.53

Washington
DC
-4.55

Kansas
.91

50

South Dakota
2.9

Hawaii
-.07

South Carolina
85.48

Hawaii
-5.65

Arkansas
.89

51

Nebraska
2.8

Washington
DC
-2.51

Nevada
84.77

Nevada
-5.86

Washington
DC
.73

Notes: All numbers here are calculated in percentage terms. Wage premium index is 100 times (ln wage
differential) for state predicted by its industrial mix. This number is negative for all states because original.
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Table 6.

Models of the Effect of Economic Variables on AFDC Caseloads

Dependent Variable

Model I

Model II

Model III

Log(Caseload/
Population)

Log(Caseload/
Population)

Change in
Log(Caseload/
Population

Variable:
Lagged dependent variable

–

0.9129***
(0.0136)

–

Unemployment rate:
Current

0.0218***
(0.0082)

0.0018
(0.0029)

-0.0001
(0.0030)

Lag 1

-0.0003
(0.0093)

0.0075***
(0.0026)

0.0005
(0.0034)

Lag 2

0.0431***
(0.0067)
0.5099***
(0.0842)

0.2005***
(0.0295)

0.0040*
(0.0024)
0.1794***
(0.0302)

-0.0945***
(0.0188)

0.0066
(0.0068)

0.0161**
(0.0069)

Employment growth (change in log of employment):
Current
1.2660***
(0.4806)

-0.2228
(0.1721)

-0.3988**
(0.1766)

Log of maximum AFDC benefit
Any statewide waiver

–

Lag 1

–

-0.5646***
(0.1736)

-0.7475***
(0.1802)

Lag 2

–

-0.3400**
(0.1401)

0.4040***
(0.1454)

Percent of employment that will be high school graduates based on industry mix:
Current
-0.0707
0.0269*
(0.0442)
(0.0155)

0.0187
(0.0160)

Lag 1

0.0359
(0.0495)

0.0249
(0.0174)

0.0270
(0.0180)

Lag 2

0.0235
(0.0392)

-0.0269**
(0.0137)

-0.0346**
(0.0142)
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Table 6. (Continued)

Dependent Variable

Model I

Model II

Model III

Log(Caseload/
Population)

Log(Caseload/
Population)

Change in
Log(Caseload/
Population

State wage premium (calculated as differential of average ln (wage) based on industry mix:
Current

0.1086
(0.0687)

-0.0114
(0.00241)

-0.0265
(0.0248)

Lag 1

-0.0311
(0.0877)

-0.0508
(0.0328)

-0.0582*
(0.0339)

Lag 2

-0.1037*
0.0615***
(0.0558)
(0.0217)
Percent of employment that would be welfare recipients based on industry mix:

0.0910***
(0.0225)

Current

2.6822**
(1.3279)

0.7886*
(0.4684)

0.5108
(0.4826)

Lag 1

1.1941
(1.7426)

-0.5080
(0.6470)

-0.7093
(0.6675)

Lag 2

0.4381
(1.2418)
0.9300

0.2957
(0.4641)
0.9915

0.4345
(0.4815)
0.7489

663

663

663

Adjusted R-square
Sample Size

Significance level: *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%.
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions use pooled time-series cross-section data of
observations on state/year cells, with data on the dependent variable for all years from 1984 to 1996 (because
of the two lags in some variables, data for 1982 and 1983 are also used), and for all 50 states plus the District
of Columbia. All regressions are weighted by 1996 values for state population. All regressions, in addition to
including variables for which coefficients are reported in table, include complete sets of state dummies and
year dummies, to control for unobserved state or national influences on welfare receipt rates. Lag lengths for
unemployment rate, employment growth, and three industrial mix variables are determined by choosing
among lag lengths from zero to two based on Akaike Information Criterion, with constraint that lag length
must be same for all three industry mix variables. F-tests reveal that for each group of current and lagged
variables for a particular state economic climate variable (e.g., unemployment), the group is statistically
significant at the five percent level in all cases except the unemployment variable for Model III, and the
welfare variable for Model III.
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Table 7.

Simulated Effects of State Economic Variables on Caseloads,
Using a Variety of Models
Unemployment
(s.d. = 1.00)

Employment
Growth
(s.d. = 1.33)

High School
Graduates
Variable
(s.d. = 0.22)

Wage Premium
Variable
(s.d. = 0.27)

Welfare
Recipient
Variable
(s.d. = 0.01)

Full model I

0.0646
(12.93)

0.0127
(2.63)

0.1301
(5.85)

-0.0263
(1.09)

4.3143
(7.23)

Full model II

0.0337
(3.73)

-0.0390
(4.32)

0.1242
(3.46)

-0.0596
(1.41)

2.2924
(2.61)

Full model III

0.0136
(1.28)

-0.0620
(5.91)

0.0710
(2.18)

-0.0925
(-1.72)

1.0205
(0.95)

Model I w/only
unemployment

0.0622
(14.40)

Model II w/only
unemployment

0.0793
(13.95)

Model III w/only
unemployment

0.0865
(11.59)

Levine-Whitmore
style model

0.0421
(9.23)
[orig = 0.0473]

Blank style
model

0.0548
(9.98)
[orig = 0.038]

Ziliak, et al
style model

0.0080
(2.80)
[orig = 0.0066]

Notes: Pseudo t-statistics, equal to mean effect divided by standard deviation from 1000 Monte Carlo
repetition of simulation, are reported in parentheses. All estimates report effect on ln (caseloads per/capita)
after four years of 1% increase in variable in that column. Estimated standard deviation of residual, in
percentage terms, of each variable, after regressing variable on set of year dummies and state dummies, is
reported below that variable at top of columns. Nine models are considered, each of which takes up one row
in table. Models I, II, and III are discussed in text. Models I, II and III with just unemployment are
identical to their original counterparts, but drop other four state economic characteristic variables. LevineWhitmore style model attempts to estimate model reported in Levine-Whitmore paper, Table 2, column 1.
The original estimated effect in their paper is reported in brackets below our estimates of a similar style
model. Blank style model attempts to estimate model similar to Blank, Table 2, column 1. Ziliak-style
model attempts to estimate model similar to Ziliak, et al, Table 4, column 4. Again, for both Blank and
Ziliak models, original estimates in author’s paper are reported in brackets below estimates we obtained
with a similar, but not identical model. For example, Blank model includes many more control variables
than we included in Blank-style model, which may explain why she found slightly lower effects of
unemployment.
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Table 8.

Simulated Effects of 1% Increase in Unemployment on
ln (caseload per/capita), Various Models
Model Used
Full Model II
(from Table 7)
Model II with only Unemployment
(from Table 7)
Full Model II, with auxiliary regressions
Employment growth held constant
High School graduates held constant
Wage premium held constant
Welfare Recipient variable held constant

Effect on ln
(caseload per/capita)
0.0337
(3.73)
0.0793
(13.95)
0.0649
(10.02)
0.0424
(4.52)
0.0618
(9.78)
0.0601
(8.15)
0.0637
(10.01)

Notes: Pseudo t-statistics from 1000 Monte Carlo repetitions of simulations are in
parentheses. There are four auxiliary regressions, regressing the four local demand
variables (other than unemployment) on unemployment and year and state dummies. Full
model II with auxiliary regressions uses these four additional equations to simulate effect of
1% increase in unemployment, with the four other demand variables allowed to change.
Remaining models drop one of four auxiliary equations, thus implicitly holding that variable
constant.
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Table 9.

Why Caseloads Increased from 1989 to 1994

Panel A:

Difference Between 1989 and 1994 Caseloads and Time Effects

Difference between ln(caseload/per capita), 1994 vs. 1989

+ 0.254

Difference explained by time dummies in previous five years, model with only
unemployment included as state economic characteristic

+ 0.275

Difference explained by time dummies in previous five years, model with all five
state economic characteristics included

-0.096

Panel B:

Breakdown of contribution of different variables to 1994 minus 1989 difference in caseloads,
model with all five state economic characteristics included

Difference in caseload five years ago

-0.004

Welfare benefits

-0.109

Waivers

0.003

Unemployment rate

-0.006

Employment growth

0.078

Industry Composition:

proportion of demand for high school graduates

0.339

Industry Composition:

average wage premium

0.020

Industry Composition:

proportion of demand for welfare recipients

0.026

Unobserved national time period effects over previous five years

-0.096

total change in ln(caseloads) to be explained

0.254

Notes: Calculations try to explain 1994 and 1989 caseloads as function of previous five year’s variables, plus
caseloads as of five years ago. As of five years ago (1989 for 1994, 1984 for 1989), caseloads per capita were
virtually identical. These calculations simulate what happens to caseloads due to values of independent
variables, allowing for lagged effects that occur due to including lags of some variables, and due to effects via
lagged dependent variables. Because the model is linear, these effects should approximately add up.
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Table 10: The effects of economic conditions on the change in metropolitan caseloads, 1990-1993
Dependent variable: Column A: change in caseloads per capita 1990-1993
Columns B, C, D: caseloads per capita, 1993
A

B

C

D

Log per capita income,
1990

-.0080**
(.0032)

-.0064**
(.0031)

-.0046
(.0030)

-.0046
(.0031)

% poverty MSA 1990

-.00024*
(.00013)

-.00004
(.00013)

-.00006
(.00013)

-.00006

Log max benefits 1990

.00079
(.0043)

.0018
(.0041)

.0004
(.0040)

.0004
(.0040)

Log max benefits 1993

-.00058
(.0046)

-.0002
(.0043)

.0014
(.0042)

.0014
(.0042)

Unemployment rate, 1990

.00054**
(.00028)

.00045*
(.00026)

.00065**
(.00027)

.00065**
(.00027)

Unemployment rate, 1993

-.00035*
(.00021)

-.00017
(.00020)

-.00027
(.0002)

-.00027
(.0003)

Gross flows, 1989-1992

.0263***
(.0043)

.0220***
(.0043)

.0203**
(.0042)

(.00013)

Job gain, 1989-92

-.0074
(.0058)

Job loss, 1989-92

.0480***
(.0091)

% employment change
1989-92

-.0286***
(.0070)

-.0280***
(.0066)

Waiver=1
(Since 1992)
Caseload per capita 1990

-.0277***
(.0064)
-.0022**
(.0008)

-.0022**
(.0008)

.827***
(.048)

.837***
(.0463)

.837***
(.0463)

Intercept

.066**
(.030)

.044
(.029)

.0264
(.0291)

.0264
(.0291)

Adj. R-square

.282

.890

.896

.896

Note: Standard errors are below the coefficient estimates. (*,**,***) denotes statistical significance at the
0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels.
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Figure 2. National Time Trends in Five Labor Demand Variables
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Figure 3. Year Dummies from Various Models Explaining ln(caseload per capita)
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